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Homeless People: Establishing Rights to Shelter
Patricia Siebert*
I'm stranded on a road that
goes from sea to sea.
A hundred thousand others are
stranded same as me.
A hundred thousand years, a
hundred thousand more,
And I ain't got no home in
this world any more.
Woody Guthrie1
I. The Increasing Homeless Population
Homelessness, 2 no stranger to the dust-bowl days of Woodie
Guthrie, is once again on the rise. Just how many people are pres-
ently homeless is almost impossible to ascertain, given the difficul-
* Patricia Siebert is a staff attorney at the Minnesota Mental Health Law
Project, a statewide advocacy project for persons with mental health problems. She
has worked to increase the number of housing alternatives available to mentally ill
people and has been involved in cases regarding group home zoning issues and ac-
cess of mentally ill people to public housing benefits. In her work, she has also em-
phasized governmental failure to provide needed and required health and social
services and to protect low-cost housing stock as being responsible for the number
of homeless mentally ill people on the streets, rather than deinstitutionalization
per se.
Patricia is a native of North Dakota and graduated in 1980 from the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin Law School. She has also been a staff attorney at Western Wis-
consin Legal Services, and has provided services to shelters for battered women.
1. Woody Guthrie, I Ain't Got No Home In This World Anymore, on Alan Lo-
max, Woody Guthrie Library of Congress Recording [sound recording]. Electra
Records, EK 271272. 3 discs, on side 5.
2. LauraSue Epstein, the author of Home at Seven, 4 Law & Inequality 409
(1986) believes that the hallmark of homelessness is not having keys to a place of
one's own. See Drew Darling, Keys Are a Dead Giveaway, Univ. of Minn. Update,
Apr. 1986, at 4 (profile of Epstein). This definition compels a realization that home-
lessness results in a painful loss of personal privacy and security, as well as the
more obvious exposure to the elements. The court in Burton v. New Jersey Dep't
of Insts. & Agencies, 147 N.J. Super. 124, 129, 370 A.2d 878, 881 (1977), pointed out
that homelessness involves more than the lack of a floor, four walls, and a roof.
Homelessness includes parallel components of lack of sufficient nourishing food
and adequate means of self-care to properly sustain life. One could also think of
homeless people as indigent persons who, by reason of recurring misfortunes of life,
lack the means to maintain a permanent residence. See Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.
2d 245 (W. Va. 1983).
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ties in counting them; estimates range from the Department of
Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) figure of 250,0003 to a
figure of approximately three million cited by the Community for
Creative Non-Violence and the National Coalition for the Home-
less.4 Most shelter advocates and the Department of Health and
Human Services believe an accurate estimate of the number of
homeless Americans to be two million.5
Who are the homeless? Until recently, the public perception
of a homeless person was that of a single male-a hobo riding the
rails, a skid-row bum, or a transient laborer. This country has be-
gun to see a new and growing population of homeless people, in-
cluding single parent families, children, immigrants, migrant
workers, battered women, people with mental health problems,
elderly people, people who have lost jobs or who have been re-
moved from public assistance, and other groups of poor people.6
3. Department of Hous. & Urban Dev., A Report to the Secretary on the
Homeless and Emergency Shelters (1984). This figure was challenged in a lawsuit
by the Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV). In Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. Pierce, the plaintiffs argued that the government's report grossly
underestimated the number of homeless people in the United States, and that as a
result, legislators, administrators, and private benefactors would be misled as to the
magnitude of the problem. No. 84-1898, slip op. at 1 (D.D.C. Sept. 4, 1984). CCNV
contended that the report would ultimately result in drastically decreased govern-
mental and private funding for homeless people. The District Court for the District
of Columbia dismissed the action, concluding, inter alia, that the report did not con-
stitute an "agency action" reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982). No. 84-1898, slip op. at 5-6. CCNV then moved to
disqualify the United States Attorney's Office from representing HUD, reasoning
that disqualification would enable the United States Attorney's Office to give fair
and impartial consideration to CCNV's request for an investigation into the HUD
report. The District of Columbia Circuit denied CCNV's motion, holding that
CCNV had no standing to challenge the United States Attorney's process of
prosecutorial and investigative decision making. Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence v. Pierce, No. 84-5682, slip op. at 6 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 6, 1986). In its opinion, the
court of appeals made clear that "[n]othing in this opinion addresses the validity of
the holding of the district court, which concerns a wholly different standing issue.
That decision will be reviewed as the appeal proceeds." Id. An appeal of the lower
court's dismissal of the action is still pending.
4. Mary Ellen Hombs & Mitch Snyder, Homelessness in America: A Forced
March to Nowhere, at xvi (1983).
5. See, e.g., Frances E. Werner, Homelessness: A Litigation Roundup, 18
Clearinghouse Rev. 1255, 1265 (1985); see also Robert Pear, The Need of the Na-
tion's Homeless Is Becoming Their Right, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1986, at E5, col. 1
(number of homeless people-those living in public or private shelters, parks,
transportation terminals, abandoned buildings, and cars-in major United States
cities as estimated by the National Coalition for the Homeless: New York-60,000,
Los Angeles-50,000, Chicago-25,000, and Detroit-27,000).
6. General Accounting Office, Homelessness: A Complex Problem and the
Federal Response 4-6 (1985) [hereinafter GAO Report]. Even children are not pro-
tected from the crisis of homelessness. "More than 20% of all homeless people in
shelters, excluding runaway shelters, are children .... In New York City alone,
over 10,000 homeless children live on the streets." David Lambert, National Trends
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At a time when the numbers of our nation's poor are increas-
ing,7 the amount of affordable housing has been steadily decreas-
ing.8 For example, the amount of single room occupancy (SRO)
housing such as cheap hotels and rooming houses, often the hous-
ing of last resort for many poor individuals, has been decimated.9
A million units were lost during the 1970's, representing almost
half the available supply, and the reduction is likely to be just as
drastic in the 1980's.10 New York City alone lost 32,000 SRO units
from 1978 to 1982.11 Nationally, one to three million low-income
units are scheduled to be demolished. 12 Reasons for the decline of
low-income housing include: greater profits available for other
types of construction, declining federal subsidies for both develop-
ers and tenants, downtown redevelopment, condominium conver-
sion, neighborhood opposition to public housing and other housing
alternatives such as group homes for mentally disabled people, and
higher taxes and income tax provisions that encourage property
abandonment.13
The cost of available housing has become an excessive burden
on the poor. An expanding number of low-income households face
the burden of rent payments that consume almost three-fourths of
the household's total income. In 1975, two million low-income
households (twenty-five percent of the total number of low-income
households) spent over seventy percent of their incomes for rent.14
This number rose to 3.7 million in 1983 (thirty percent of all low-
income households).15 While the proportion of income devoted to
rent is rising among poor people, the level of federal support for
housing costs has declined since 1980 under a Reagan administra-
tion policy of shifting housing aid away from subsidies for con-
Indicate Growing Hostility Toward Young People, Youth Law News, Jan.-Feb.
1986, at 1-2.
7. See, e.g, Poverty: the War Isn't Over, Newsweek, Sept. 9, 1985, at 24;
America Becomes Less Equal, New Republic, Feb. 18, 1985, at 7.
8. GAO Report, supra note 6, at 25.
9. Frances E. Werner & David B. Bryson, A Guide to the Preservation and
Maintenance of Single Room Occupancy (SRO) Housing, 15 Clearinghouse Rev.
999, 1003-04 (1981-82).
10. GAO Report, supra note 6, at 25.
11. New York State Dep't of Social Servs., 1 Homelessness in N.Y. State: a Re-
port to the Governor and the Legislature 40 (1984).
12. Commissioner Andrews' Task Force on Homeless Mentally Ill Persons, Is-
sues and Recommendations: A Plan for Assisting the Homeless Mentally Ill 1
(1985) (citing National Coalition for the Homeless (1985)).
13. GAO Report, supra note 6, at 25.
14. Id. The statistics were computed by the GAO from data obtained from the
American Housing Survey's national data tapes, 1975-1981 and 1983. Low income




struction and operation of public housing.' 6 The Urban Institute
estimates that about 300,000 more families were living in substan-
dard housing at the end of 1985 than there would have been under
a continuation of pre-1981 policies.i7
The plight of homeless mentally ill persons has recently re-
ceived much media attention. Some estimates indicate that one-
third of the nation's homeless people may be mentally ill. i8 Dein-
stitutionalization is often cited as the reason for this disproportion-
ate representation among those on the streets. The American
Psychiatric Association, however, has conducted a task force study
of homeless mentally ill persons which concluded that "homeless-
ness among the mentally ill is not the result of de-institutionaliza-
tion per se but [rather] the way de-institutionalization has been
implemented... and the related problem of the lack of clear un-
derstanding of the needs of the chronically mentally ill in the
community."19
The Association made several recommendations as a result of
its task force findings. Foremost was a recommendation that "a
comprehensive and integrated system of care for this vulnerable
population of the mentally ill, with designated responsibility, with
accountability, and with adequate fiscal resources, must be estab-
lished."20 The task force further stated that "any attempt to ad-
dress the problem of the homeless mentally ill must begin with
provisions for meeting their basic needs: food, shelter, and cloth-
ing."2i Finally, the task force recommended the establishment of
a range of community housing settings, adequate and accessible
psychiatric rehabilitation services, general medical care, crisis serv-
ices, social services, and a system for ensuring continuing provision
of comprehensive services. 22
The conclusions of the American Psychiatric Association re-
garding mentally ill homeless persons can be equally applied to
other groups of homeless people. Without the basic necessities of
adequate food, clothing, and shelter, people are not able to success-
fully address factors which may contribute to their homelessness,
such as illiteracy and lack of education, unemployment, limited in-
come, or family dysfunction.
16. Id. See also Frances Fox Piven & Richard Cloward, The New Class War:
Reagan's Attack on the Welfare State and Its Consequences 18 (1982).
17. GAO Report, supra note 6, at 26.
18. Abandoned, Newsweek, Jan. 26, 1986, at 14-20.
19. H. Richard Lamb, Deinstitutionalization and the Homeless Mentally 1li, 35
Hosp. & Community Psychiatry 899 (1984).
20. Id. at 908.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 908-09.
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II. The Right to Shelter: Some Legal Responses
Recognizing the role of shelter as a first line of defense
against continuing poverty, public interest lawyers across the coun-
try have been active in bringing lawsuits affirming the right to ad-
equate shelter.23 They have used a variety of legal theories based
on state and federal laws, often involving innovative and creative
arguments, in order to advance cases that assert and protect a basic
right to shelter. Claims have relied on state constitutions, state
welfare laws and regulations, and to a lesser extent on federal stat-
utory rights and federal regulations. This article, which does not
attempt to be exhaustive, discusses some of the leading cases.
A. Federal Constitutional and Statutory Law
Efforts to ground a right to shelter in the United States Con-
stitution, based on due process and equal protection claims under
the fifth and fourteenth amendments, have not prevailed. In the
early 1970's, the Supreme Court held that no federal constitutional
guarantee of adequate housing exists. In Lindsey v. Normet,24 ten-
ants challenged Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer
(FED) Statute,2 5 which granted landlords several significant proce-
dural advantages over tenants. Among other provisions, tenants
were precluded from raising the defense that the landlord failed to
maintain the premises in accordance with local housing codes. 26
The plaintiffs argued that because housing was involved, the right
23. This essay presents an overview of the legal claims uitiized by advocates for
homeless people. For a comprehensive look at right-to-shelter litigation, see Fran-
ces Werner, supra note 5; see also Sara Johnson, Case Docket and Legislative Up-
date Re: Homeless (1984) (available from the National Clearinghouse for Legal
Services, Inc., 407 South Dearborn, Suite 400, Chicago, IL 60605).
24. 341 F. Supp. 638 (D. Or. 1970), affd in part rev'd in part, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
The tenants in Lindsey refused to pay their rent after the City Bureau of Buildings
declared their single-family dwelling unfit for habitation because substandard con-
ditions existed in the building (such as broken windows, missing rear steps, and im-
proper sanitation) and after the landlord failed to make certain repairs at the
tenants' request. 405 U.S. at 58-59. Before the landlord instituted an action for sum-
mary eviction, the tenants brought a class action in federal district court seeking
both injunctive and declaratory relief arguing that the eviction statute was uncon-
stitutional on its face. The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss
the complaint, finding that the statute did not violate due process or the equal pro-
tection clause. 341 F. Supp. at 640-42.
25. Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 105.105-.165 (1985). An FED action is an action for sum-
mary eviction, also referred to as an action for possession of the premises.
The Oregon statute provided that a landlord may bring an action for possession
if the tenant has failed to pay rent within ten days of its due date or the tenant is
holding contrary to some other covenant in the lease, the landlord gives proper no-
tice for terminating the rental agreement, and the tenant does not leave the prem-
ises after the expiration date specified in the notice. Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 63.
26. The statute restricted the issues in FED actions to whether the tenant had
1986]
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of the tenant was "fundamental," and the Constitution would re-
quire a compelling governmental interest to support the summary
eviction proceedings of the Oregon statute. In rejecting the plain-
tiffs' claim, the Supreme Court stated:
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sani-
tary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial
remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to
perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of ac-
cess to dwellings of a particular quality .... Absent constitu-
tional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and the
definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not
judicial, functions.27
Advocates on behalf of homeless people have fared better
when bringing claims based on federal statutory laws involving
various categorical assistance programs supported by federal funds,
including Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).28
Although these federal programs leave a high degree of discretion
to the states in drafting their own plans, once a state commits it-
self to a particular plan and receives federal funds for implementa-
tion, federal law requires the state to comply with the terms of
that plan.
In Koster v. Webb ,29 the plaintiffs were AFDC families living
in New York who had been evicted from their apartments. The
New York AFDC plan, as it appears in the state's administrative
code, sets forth certain emergency services which "shall be pro-
vided" by the state, including "securing family shelter."30 The
plaintiffs claimed the New York State Department of Social Serv-
ices was providing either no emergency housing whatsoever or
grossly substandard emergency housing. The district court denied
the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and
motion for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiffs' com-
plaint stated both a federal claim under the federal Civil Rights
Act31 and a valid pendent state law claim.32 Regarding the federal
claim, the court concluded:
paid rent or otherwise complied with the provisions of the rental covenant. Lind-
sey, 405 U.S. at 65.
27. Id. at 74.
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1982).
29. 598 F. Supp. 1134 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), class certification granted sub nom. Kos-
ter v. Perales, 108 F.R.D. 46 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
30. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 372.4(d) (1982).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
32. The state law claims were based on various provisions of New York Social
Services Law. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 62, 131(1), 371(3), 397(1) (McKinney
1983). In Koster, the court commented: "[P]laintiffs have stated a claim by alleging
the denial of rights created explicitly by the Social Services Law to aid, care and
support destitute children." 598 F. Supp. at 1138 n.2. Whether emergency shelter is
[Vol. 4:393
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It is clear that New York State voluntarily has committed it-
self to provide emergency family shelter to needy families
with dependent children as part of its participation in the
AFDC program. The State, having assumed the responsibility
for providing emergency shelter pursuant to the Social Secur-
ity Act, is bound to fulfill its promise.3 3
A similar lawsuit was soon brought in New York state court.
In McCain v. Koch ,34 the defendant city conceded that under the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children Act it was obligated to
assist families in locating emergency shelter for thirty days in each
twelve-month period. The defendants argued that beyond that
time period, however, their obligation only extended to providing
homeless families with cash grants.35  The court granted the
plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction and ordered the city
to take certain steps while a final decision of the plaintiffs' claims
pended. The order required that families with children in need of
emergency housing or assistance be provided notice of the right to
emergency housing and notice of the right to a hearing to contest
the denial of emergency housing.36 Families granted emergency
housing were to be placed in facilities meeting New York City fire,
health, safety, and residential regulation requirements. Shelter lo-
cations were to be chosen in light of the children's education
needs. Families were to be provided with emergency housing and
assistance until they received the opportunity to contest denial of
emergency housing and assistance. 37
the guaranteed remedy or appropriate remedy would be determined at the trial on
the merits.
33. 598 F. Supp. at 1137. The court noted that neither the federal statutes nor
the accompanying regulations require the states to supply emergency shelter for
homeless families with children eligible for assistance, but states are required to in-
dicate whether shelter is one of the services to be provided. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 233.129(a)(4) (1985).
34. 127 Misc. 2d 23, 484 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1984), modified, 117 A.D.2d 198, 502
N.Y.S.2d 720 (1986).
35. Id. at 24, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
36. Id. at 23, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
37. Id. at 23-24, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 987. In issuing its order, the court emphasized
that the city of New York must provide shelter which meets reasonable minimum
standards:
These general principles are not immutable nor exhaustive, but indica-
tive of the minimum standards which this society at this time finds ac-
ceptable within the meaning of the word shelter. It may well be that
in other places and times shelter means or meant literally, a roof over
one's head. In a civilized society a "shelter" which does not meet mini-
mal standards of cleanliness, warmth, space and rudimentary conve-
niences is no shelter at all. Providing a homeless family with a hotel
room-often a cubicle in a crumbling plaster palace, or in rooms in-
fested with vermin, with filthy bedding, children sleeping on the floor
for lack of cribs, an entire family sleeping in one bed, exposed electri-
cal wires and rooms soiled by human waste are unacceptable shelter
1986]
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On appeal, the lower court's preliminary injunction was mod-
ified.38 The state appellate division upheld that portion of the pre-
liminary injunction requiring the city to provide emergency
shelter to eligible families for thirty days as required by the state
plan,39 concluding that the plaintiffs had a high probability of es-
tablishing at trial that two provisions of federal law had been vio-
lated. Since New York had elected to provide the service of
"securing family shelter" in an emergency,40 the plaintiffs there-
fore could have established that the state and city Departments of
Social Services' failure to assure emergency shelter for all eligible
families violated the Social Security Act requirement of
mandatory enforcement of the state plan.4 ' In so ruling, the court
utilized the precedent of Koster v. Webb.42 The court also found
that the defendant's "ad hoc, uneven practices and policy" further
violated regulations enacted under the Social Security Act,4 3 which
prohibit states from excluding individuals "on an arbitrary or un-
reasonable basis.""
In order to determine the plaintiffs' right to emergency shel-
ter beyond the thirty-day period, the court determined it was nec-
essary to reach the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. The plaintiffs
had claimed that the city's failure to assure emergency shelter to
homeless families beyond the thirty-day period violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.45 The plaintiffs
relied on the consent decree in Callahan v. Carey,46 in which the
city agreed to make emergency shelter available to homeless single
men who met the eligibility criteria of the home relief program, or
for anyone, and especially families with young children. The equitable
powers of this court may be invoked to compel compliance with mini-
mal standards. If convicted criminals have such rights, the homeless
who become interim wards of a governmental entity are entitled to no
less.
Id. at 24-25, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
38. McCain v. Koch, 117 A.D.2d 198, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1986).
39. For the text of New York's state plan, see N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 350.j(3)
(McKinney 1983); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 372.4(d) (1982).
40. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 350.j(3) (McKinney 1983); N.Y. Admin. Code tit.
18, § 372.4(d) (1982).
41. 117 A.D.2d at 212, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 728.
42. 598 F. Supp. 1134, 1137 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
43. 45 C.F.R. 233.10(a)(1) (1985).
44. 117 A.D.2d at 212, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 728 (quoting Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132
(1982)).
45. Id. at 214, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 729.
46. No. 42582/79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 26, 1981) (order entering final consent de-
cree). For a discussion of Callahan, see infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
The Callahan decision was successfully used to establish the same right to emer-
gency shelter for homeless women based on the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
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who suffered a physical or mental dysfunction. The court agreed
that the plaintiffs had a right to shelter equal to that provided for
homeless men under the Callahan decree.47 In fact, the court be-
lieved the needs of families, particularly children, are greater than
those of single adults. The court concluded that the "[d]efendants'
less than equal treatment of plaintiffs is plainly irrational."48
The appellate division reversed the lower court on important
protections based on state constitutional and statutory law, holding
that the lower court erred in invoking its equitable powers to or-
der the city's compliance with certain minimal standards of de-
cency and habitability.49  Reluctantly, the appellate division
deferred to the legislature's power to set the standards for shelter
facilities for welfare recipients. 50 The court concluded that in view
of the broad discretion given to the legislature, the plaintiffs were
not likely to prove that the state constitution 5 substantively guar-
antees "minimal physical standards of cleanliness, warmth, space,
and rudimentary convenience in emergency shelter."52
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim that a New York
city regulation53 created an entitlement to continued residency in
the emergency shelter of one's choice,54 and invalidated transfer
provisions ordered by the lower court.55 The court ruled, however,
that the city regulation required emergency housing placement
based upon primary consideration of the needs of children, includ-
ing educational needs and the minimal disruption of community
ties.56
After the lower court's preliminary injunction in McCain was
granted, a similarly situated group of homeless plaintiffs at-
tempted to sue the city of New York in federal court on essentially
the same grounds: failure to provide them with decent, safe, and
sanitary emergency housing.5 7 The defendants in Canaday v. Koch
47. 117 A.D.2d at 212, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 729.
48. Id. In addition to the plaintiffs federal constitutional claims, the appellate
division believed the plaintiffs would probably also succeed on their claim that arti-
cle 17 of the New York State Constitution requires the defendants to provide emer-
gency shelter for homeless families. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
49. 117 A.D.2d at 216, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 731.
50. Id.
51. For further discussion of state constitutional arguments, see infra note 61
and accompanying text.
52. 117 A.D.2d at 217, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 731.
53. For the text of the regulation, see N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18
§ 352.3(g)(1) (1985).
54. 117 A.D.2d at 218, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 732.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Canaday [sic] v. Koch, 598 F. Supp. 1139 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), action stayed, 608
F. Supp. 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd sub nom. Cannady v. Valentin, 768 F.2d 501 (2d
1986]
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urged the federal court to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction
due to the pending state court proceeding in McCain v. Koch. The
District Court for the Southern District of New York stayed the
action, invoking the doctrine of Burford v. Sun Oil Co .,58 and sim-
ply concluded that the case "would better be decided in the state
system."59 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed:
We are neither blind nor insensitive to the serious plight of
the homeless in New York City and other cities throughout
our country. That these plaintiffs seek housing for homeless
families only underscores the critical social and economic
problems at hand. But while these problems are serious, stub-
born, and frustrating, we do not believe that federal courts are
more adequately suited to address them than state courts.60
As the Second Circuit suggested, state courts have indeed ex-
pressed concern over the problem of homelessness and have at-
tempted to fashion remedies based on both federal and state laws.
B. State Constitutional and Statutory Law
In several states, homeless plaintiffs have brought lawsuits
based on state constitutional provisions and state statutes gov-
erning adult protection services and categorical or general assist-
ance programs. For example, the New York Constitution provides
in relevant part: "The aid, care and support of the needy are public
concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its sub-
divisions, and in such a manner and by such means, as the legisla-
ture may from time to time determine." 61
The New York Court of Appeals interpreted this section to
mean that the state has an "affirmative duty to aid the needy."62
In addition, New York Social Services Law provides for the assist-
ance and care of the needy as required by the state constitution.63
Although neither the state constitution nor the New York Social
Services Law explicitly guarantees a right to shelter, the city and
state of New York entered into a landmark consent decree in Cal-
Cir. 1985). The plaintiffs were "homeless, indigent mothers with children who...
have been, are being, or will be denied lawful emergency housing by the defend-
ants." 598 F. Supp. at 1140-41.
58. 319 U.S. 315 (1943). (The "Burford doctrine" holds that it is in the public
interest that federal courts of equity should exercise their discretionary power with
proper regard for the independence of state governments in carrying out their
policies.)
59. 608 F. Supp. at 1470.
60. 768 F.2d at 503 (emphasis in original).
61. N.Y. Const. art. XVII, § 1.
62. Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 8, 371 N.E.2d 449, 452, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728, 731
(1977).
63. N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 62(1), 131(1), 131(3) (McKinney 1983).
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lahan v. Carey .64 In that consent decree, the city and state de-
fendants obligated themselves to provide emergency housing to
homeless men. The decree set forth detailed standards to be main-
tained at public shelters.
In the subsequent case of Eldredge v. Koch ,65 the court held
that under the equal protection clause homeless women must have
access to equivalent facilities. A New York state court recently re-
lied on Callahan to uphold a preliminary injunction requiring the
city of New York and the state to provide emergency shelter be-
yond the limited thirty-day statutory period to homeless AFDC
families. 66
Similarly, the West Virginia Supreme Court in Hodge v. Gins-
berg,67 broadly interpreting the statutory term "incapacitated
adult," held that the state's Social Services for Adults Act required
the Department of Welfare to provide shelter to indigent persons
lacking the means to maintain a permanent residence, even when
such persons were not mentally or physically impaired. The West
Virginia court's willingness to fashion a remedy is an instructive
example of how a seemingly unrelated statute can be creatively
utilized to further one's right to adequate housing.
C Challenging Arbitrary Requirements Posing
Barriers to Assistance
In some states, an applicant for welfare benefits or emer-
gency housing must provide an address or a form of identification.
For homeless people, such requirements are often difficult, if not
impossible, to meet. Some of these requirements have been suc-
cessfully challenged by homeless people seeking benefits. For ex-
ample, in Lake v. Illinois Department of Public Aid ,68 state and
city defendants entered into a consent decree whereby applications
for General Assistance could no longer be denied solely because
applicants did not have a permanent residence or because they
were in rescue missions or other temporary housing facilities.
Similarly, in Ehlers v. Bates ,69 homeless plaintiffs complained that
they were arbitrarily being denied public assistance, food stamps,
and medical assistance because they could not produce a perma-
64. No. 42582/79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 26, 1981).
65. 118 Misc. 2d 163, 459 N.Y.S.2d 960 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 98 A.D.2d
675, 469 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1983).
66. McCain v. Koch, 117 A.D.2d 198, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1986). For a further dis-
cussion of this case, see supra notes 34-56 and accompanying text.
67. 303 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1983).
68. No. 79 CH 3434 (Cook County Cir. Ct. July 10, 1979).
69. No. 10525/83 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 16, 1984).
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nent local address; they had been living in their cars. A consent
decree was entered invalidating the address requirement.70
D. Right to Continued Availability of Shelter Services
Once They Have Been Provided by the
Government
The right to have adequate shelter remain continuously avail-
able once it is provided by the government has also been the sub-
ject of litigation. In Williams v. Barry,71 plaintiffs challenged a
decision on the part of the city to close several shelters for the
homeless. Plaintiffs argued that the components of due process-
notice and an opportunity to be heard-had not been met before
the decision was made. The District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia, however, held that fifth amendment due process required
only notice detailing the reasons for the proposed shelter closing
and an opportunity to present written comments. The defendants
were not required to provide an oral hearing. The rationale of-
fered by the court was that this case did not involve individual, ad-
judicatory determinations but rather a broad-based legislative
decision; therefore, only a minimum level of due process was nec-
essary. The District of Columbia Circuit Court affirmed this
holding.72
Similarly, an attempt by the Community for Creative Non-
Violence to challenge yet another shelter closing by the govern-
ment in the District of Columbia did not succeed. In Robbins v.
Reagan ,73 the plaintiffs argued that the shelter closing violated the
Administrative Procedure Act.74 The district court held that the
closing was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, and
was otherwise in accordance with the law. On appeal, the District
of Columbia Circuit Court affirmed the decision.
As long as the shelter being provided is within minimal stan-
dards of decency, homeless people might not have a right to ex-
press shelter preferences. In Caton v. Barry,75 another District of
Columbia case, residents of a family shelter alleged that their
transfer to a different, less desirable shelter placed them in unsafe,
inferior living conditions. They claimed a property interest in be-
ing allowed to remain in the first shelter. The district court held
70. Id.
71. 490 F. Supp. 941 (D.D.C. 1980), affd in part and vacated in part, 708 F.2d
789 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
72. 708 F.2d at 792.
73. 616 F. Supp. 1259 (D.D.C. 1985), qffd in part, 780 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
74. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982).
75. 500 F. Supp. 45 (D.D.C. 1980).
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that conditions at the second shelter were not so unsafe or inade-
quate as to constitute a constructive eviction or denial of benefits
in violation of due process of law.76
In essence, where shelter has been provided by government
largess rather than according to welfare statutes or regulations,
courts have not accorded homeless people a vested interest signifi-
cant enough to entitle them to due process hearings before those
shelters are closed.
E. Right of Private Providers to Operate Shelters
In many locales, private charities who provide shelter to
homeless people have encountered intense opposition. In most
cases local zoning ordinances have been the tool used to keep
homeless people out of residential communities.
An attempt to use a zoning ordinance to close a shelter was
averted in St John's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Hobo-
ken .77 In that case, the church obtained an injunction against the
city prohibiting it from using its zoning laws to close the shelter.
The Superior Court of New Jersey held that in sheltering the
homeless, the church and its parishioners were engaging in the
free exercise of religion, and the city's use of its zoning authority
to curtail such free exercise violated the first amendment. In
reaching this result, the court noted that caring for the homeless
and the poor was one of the basic mandates in the Judeo-Christian
heritage. The court further found that imminent and irreparable
harm, one of the conditions precedent to equitable relief, had been
met:
If the shelter is closed its occupants will be left without food
or shelter. Government alone is not presently able to cope
with this grave social problem.... St. John's represents the
only bulwark these homeless people have. To tear that bul-
wark away would be a travesty of justice and compassion. Any
inconvenience to the City of Hoboken and its other residents
pales into insignificance when contrasted with what the occu-
pants of the shelter would have to face if turned out into the
city streets in winter weather. 78
The court concluded with the proviso that the church was
obliged to make a good faith effort to comply with applicable
health and safety regulations. Other lawsuits on this issue in other
jurisdictions have reached similar results. 79
76. Id. at 53.
77. 195 N.J. Super. 414, 479 A.2d 935 (1983).
78. Id. at 421, 479 A.2d at 939.
79. See Werner, supra note 5, at 1262-64.
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F. Right of Homeless, Mentally Ill People to Live in
Community-Based Residential Facilities
Life presents special difficulties for those who face the double
burden of being homeless and mentally ill. As attorney and pov-
erty law expert Frances Werner has noted:
Lacking appropriate housing, the mentally ill have no choice
but to live on the streets or in public shelters, both hostile en-
vironments that frequently result in a relapse to more severe
mental illness. These people are then returned, often repeat-
edly, to costly inpatient facilities, only to be discharged to the
streets to repeat the cycle.8 0
Community resistance to residences for mentally ill people
has been a significant barrier for homeless mentally ill persons.
The Fifth Circuit had held that zoning laws which act to exclude
"group homes" for the mentally retarded from neighborhoods
should be reviewed with "intermediate scrutiny" under the equal
protection clause,8 ' but was recently reversed by the United States
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled that mentally retarded
individuals are not considered members of a quasi-suspect class for
purposes of equal protection analysis, and that mental retardation
may legitimately be taken into consideration in a wide range of
governmental decisions, including zoning. In Cleburne Living
Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, the Supreme Court held that a
city ordinance requiring a special use permit prior to establishing a
group home for mentally retarded persons in a residential neigh-
borhood was rationally related to a legitimate government interest
and valid on its face.8 2 The Court invalidated the ordinance as ap-
plied in that instance, however, clarifying that "mere negative atti-
tudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly
cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for
treating a home for the mentally retarded differently from apart-
ment houses, multiple dwellings, and the like."8 3
The Cleburne case, although in theory failing to extend a
greater level of scrutiny to laws involving mentally disabled peo-
ple, clearly limits the factors which a community may consider in
reaching zoning decisions excluding particular groups of people
from living in a neighborhood. In that sense, the decision may
benefit homeless people rejected by a community because of the
fear that they are different.
80. Id. at 1264.
81. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.
1984), afJd in part and vacated in part, 105 S.Ct. 3249 (1985).
82. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
83. Id.
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III. Conclusion
Whatever the cause of homelessness for a particular person,
and regardless of the legal theory advocating a right to shelter, the
cases discussed here contain an underlying philosophical assump-
tion that all people are entitled to the basic needs of human exist-
ence-food, clothing, and shelter. Ike, one of the homeless people
in Home At Seven, summed up this basic desire for a room of one's
own to a church worker at the shelter: "Y'know, you ask me what
I want more than anything in the world. I want to live in my own
place, where I say who comes and goes. I want to sit down at my
own table, to eat my own dinner, with no one, or someone I choose
to eat with. Is that too much to ask, Larraine?"8 4
84. LauraSue Epstein, Home at Seven, supra note 2, at 465.

